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The European labour markets are characterized by the existence of trade unions with extensive 
coverage whereas wage contracts are typically determined through decentralized firm-union 
bargaining. On the other hand, as it particularly refers to migrant and ethnic minority groups, 
equally-skilled workers often face lower reservation wages. We argue that these facts may lead 
unions to opt for discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees. At the same time 
firms may nonetheless opt for non-discrimination in wages insofar as they would profitably 
“advertise” it as an exertion of  corporate social responsibility ( csr). We show that, if the 
consumers’ valuation of non-discrimination is sufficiently high, the latter strategies would as 
well be compatible with the unions’ best interest in the equilibrium. Otherwise, we propose that 
to efficiently combat wage discrimination policy makers should instead of firms undertake csr-
advertisement in the event of non-discrimination. Yet, such an antidiscrimination policy would 
always entail a net loss in social welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
The European economy has recently experienced a rapid growth of interest in the 
exertion and the implications of  corporate social responsibility ( csr) in the labour market. 
Perhaps because, according to the public stereotyping, workers are considered to be among the 
key stakeholders in any firm and there is evidence on the increasing importance which 
consumers attach to companies who demonstrate their social responsibility by practically 
recognizing that
1. At the same time the higher participation of ethnic minorities, the elderly, and 
people with disabilities in the labour market, challenge firms to adopt diversity and anti-
discriminatory schemes, and an increasing number of firms are indeed doing so.
2  Not 
(necessarily) for ethical and legal reasons, but rather for the economic benefits which such 
policies are expected to deliver.
3  
Turning to the institutions, the EU in fact seems to be ahead of those trends by issuing the 
Anti-discrimination Employment Directive (2000/78/EC) establishing the principle of diversity 
and non-discrimination.
4 While, according to the resolutions of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (2002), a “partnership between firms, government, and civilians” has considered to 
be the key to progress on international sustainable development. Firms have therefore been 
assigned a two-fold role in enabling the society to reap the benefits of globalization: To exert 
                                                        
1These are some of the key findings of the European Business Test Panel (EBTP, 2005) survey which examines the 
businesses case for diversity and their benefits across EU (25). The vast majority (83%) agreed that diversity 
initiating had a positive impact on their business. While a major benefit of diversity, receiving a score 38%, is its 
ability to enhance a firm’s reputation and image and its standing within local communities.  
2Based on the EBTP (2005) survey, just under half (48%) of all businesses responding are actively engaged in 
promoting workplace diversity and anti-discrimination.  
3For many firms legal compliance is a crucial reason for adopting anti-discriminatory policies. Yet, the driven 
incentive is the desired outcome (EBTP, 2005). 
4 The purpose of Directive #78 (OJ L 303 27/11/2000), is to lay down a framework for combating discrimination, on 
the grounds of religion or beliefs, disability and age or sexual orientation, as regards employment and occupation. In 
particular, Directive #78  applies to all persons (regarding both the public and private sectors), in relation to: (a) 
Conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection criteria and recruitment 
conditions, whatever is the branch of activity and the level of the professional hierarchy (including promotion). (b) 
Access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and 
retraining, including practical work experience. (c) Employment and working conditions, including dismissals and 
pay, (d) Membership of and involvement in an organization of workers or employers, or any organization whose 
members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such organizations.  
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(corporate) social responsibility regarding ethnic or other minorities in the labour market and 
also report that responsibility.  
It thus seems that exerting (and informing the public about) csr in the labour market, as 
well as elsewhere, should today be amongst the firms’ priorities. While, apart from setting up 
minimum legal standards for the minorities, the role of policy makers should in turn be to raise 
the public awareness on the benefits which such a firms’ proactive approach can bring to the 
society.  
The scope of this paper is to explore along the previous lines equality  versus 
discrimination in the labour market, with a view to assess the factors and policies addressing 
either instance. In particular, given the EU-Anti-discrimination Employment Directive, our focus 
is on aspects of pay discrimination. To this end the empirical evidence provides a strong 
indication that differential treatment, particularly regarding ethnic minority groups and economic 
migrants, is (still) significant in Europe and it might be related with other than productivity 
factors.
5 
The theoretical foundations of labour market discrimination go back to the seminal 
papers of G. Becker, and K. Arrow. In summary, according to Becker’s (1957) approach 
discrimination arises from “a taste for discrimination” against minority workers on the part of 
employers
6; in Arrow’s (1972) “statistical discrimination” hypothesis on the other hand 
discrimination results from the employers’ uncertainty about the individual quality of workers 
which is biased against minority workers.
7  
In our approach, while we maintain employer’s uncertainty (yet unbiased) about the 
relative individual quality of workers, we clearly abstain from any taste to discriminate on the 
                                                        
5See: Riach and Rich, (2002); Weichselbaumer, (2003); Carlsson and Rooth, (2006). 
6 This motivation implies that employers may be willing to forego some profits to avoid the “psychic costs” of 
interracial contact. 
7 Employers need a hiring test to unveil a worker’s true productivity, since the screening process to determine 
his/her qualifications is costly. Therefore, and since prior expectation of productivity differs across groups, wage 
differentials may arise among workers of identical productivity.   4 
part of anyone and against anybody. In a context of union-oligopoly decentralized bargaining we 
propose that wage discrimination among equally-skilled workers may endogenously emerge as 
long as workers can be ex ante grouped according to different opportunity cost(s) of employment 
(e.g., reservation wages). On the other hand nonetheless consumers may ceteris paribus attach 
higher valuation to the product of a firm which exerts csr by not discriminating in pay against 
anyone of its employees; of course, so long as they are informed about that.  Hence, though wage 
discrimination seems to be the unions’ optimal choice whenever consumers are ignorant and/or 
they do not care about non-discrimination in wages, firms may independently achieve higher 
profits by strategically opting for non-discrimination in wages and advertising it as an exertion of 
csr. If, by doing so, they can vertically differentiate their product enough to compensate for both 
the csr- advertisement costs and the higher unit costs of production which non-discrimination 
relative to discrimination entails. Such an option of strategic csr on the part of firms may in turn 
prove to be compatible with the unions’ best interest, as well, if the consumers’ valuation of non-
discrimination is sufficiently high. If not, we subsequently propose that in order to deter wage 
discrimination a policy maker should instead of firms undertake csr-advertisement in the event 
of non-discrimination in wages. Yet, such an antidiscrimination policy would always entail a net 
loss in social welfare.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop our structural 
model envisaging a unionized industrial sector where two firms producing ex-ante horizontally 
differentiated goods compete a la Cournot. Both firms may as well differentiate ex-post their 
products, vertically, in the event of firm-specific  csr/ non-discrimination in wages. Under 
decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining, and in the presence of ex-ante grouping of the sector’s 
workers according to different reservation wages, the postulated sequence of events is 
subsequently explained. Solving that game in section 3 we show that, and reason why, in the 
absence of an active anti-discrimination policy non-discrimination in pay may (or may not)   5 
endogenously emerge. Based upon these findings, in section 4 we propose a public csr- 
advertisement policy to deter wage discrimination with an explicit view of its welfare effects. 
Our findings are conclusively evaluated in Section 5.  
 
2. The Model 
The product market of our reference industrial sector  X consists of two unionized firms 
which compete a la Cournot in differentiated goods. We assume that each firm produces with 
constant returns to scale in only the labour input, given that the deployed capital input is always 
sufficient to produce the good.  Specifically, the production function of each firm is i i i N k x = ; 
, 2 , 1 = i where xi denotes output, Ni is the number of equally-skilled employees of firm i, and  i k  
is the productivity of labour in firm i. Restricting our analysis to firms with equally efficient 
production technologies we moreover normalize 1 = i k .  
The population of consumers in our envisaged product market is comprised of   
individuals with identical tastes. All of them, perceiving  csr exerted by any firm as an 
improvement in the quality of the firm’s product. Let this improvement be of a measureh ˛
+ ￿  
whenever in particular the firm does not discriminate wages across its employees. Of course such 
a perception for quality improvement materializes only so long as consumers are being informed 
about that. Let hence  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i s be a measure of the information received by the representative 
consumer about non-discrimination in wages on the part of firm i.  Equivalently,  i s  measures the 
probability with which the representative consumer will receive information about the latter 
event.  Then, like in Hackner (2000), Garella and Petrakis (2005), our postulated preferences 
specification combines (possible) vertical differentiation with standard [ a la  Dixit (1979)] 
horizontal/brand differentiation. In particular, the utility function of the representative consumer 
in sector X is given by,   6 
 
m x x x x x hs x hs m x x u j i j i j j i i j i + - + - + + + = 2 / ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , , (
2 2 g                 (1)        
 
Where i x ; , 2 , 1 = „ j i  stands for the quantity of the good/brand ibought by the representative 
consumer, m is the respective quantity of a composite good (produced by the rest of the economy 
and sold at a price which is normalized to unity), and  ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ g  is a measure of substitutability 
among brands in sector X
8. Note that, only if 0 > i s , h enters in the representative consumer’s 
utility function additively, thus implying a vertical shift (of a measure i hs ˛
+ ￿ ) in her demand 
function for brand i.  
Normalizing the population of consumers to unity, the maximization of (1)  w.r.t. 
[ , 1 x , , 2 x  m], subject to the representative consumer’s budget constraint, subsequently delivers 
the inverse demand function for brand/firm i,  
 
j i i i x x hs p g - - + =1 . 2 , 1 ; = „ i j                                                                             (2) 
 
Note now that  i s  effectively stands for the percentage of the total consumer population 
which are informed about the exertion of  csr by firm  i, whenever the latter firm does not 
discriminate wages. Informing consumers about csr/wage non discrimination is however costly. 
Hence, for vertical differentiation to be materialized, a csr-advertisement cost must be incurred 
                                                        
8 If  γ→0 these brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated whereas  γ  →1corresponds to the case of (almost) 
homogeneous goods/brands.   7 
by firm i (or by someone else), whenever this firm does not discriminate wages.
9 Assuming that 
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Hence, the following profit formula arises for firm 2 , 1 ; = „ j i  in sector X. 
 
A
i i i i j i i i C x C x x x hs - - - - + = P ) ( ) 1 ( g                                                                (4)                                                                
 
Where  ) ( ) ( i i i i N C x C = stands for the production/labour costs of firm  ), 2 , 1 (= i and 0 ‡
A
i C  if   
]). , 0 [ ( 0
+ ￿ ˛ ￿ ‡ i i hs s
10  
Turning our attention to the structure and conditions of the labour market in sector X, we 
assume that the (presumably) equally-skilled workers who find a job within each i firm are by 
default organized in to the firm’s trade union. That is, under decentralized firm-union bargaining, 
a collective agreement struck in firm/union pair i covers any employee in firm i regardless of 
his/her union-membership status
11.  
Yet, the workers opting for a job in sector X can be ex ante grouped according to different 
reservation wages. In particular, we postulate that there exist two groups of workers:  0 N and  
d N  , with reservation wages  R w  and   R dw  ;  0 > R w >0; , 0 1 > > d  respectively.  Prominent 
examples for  Nd seem to be the economic migrants as well as the aged and long-term 
                                                        
9 Verification of firm-specific csr/ wage non-discrimination can be assured if the particular firm (or someone else) 
delegates the relevant information processing to an independent agent, for instance to an advertisement company, 
with established credibility.  
10 In case of course the firm i, and not someone else, undertakes csr-advertisement. 
11 There is evidence that such an open shop scheme is sustained in a number of European countries, like in Greece, 
France, and Spain (see e.g., Hartog and Theeuwes [1992], Vlassis [2003]).   8 
unemployed workers. They typically face lower opportunity costs of employment, relative to 
“regular” (N0) workers, and/or they may not be eligible to receive the unemployment benefit. In 
order to find a job, anywhere, a worker belonging to the d N  group would then be willing to 
accept a wage, even lower than the unemployment benefit (say R w ), equal to his/her disutility of 
work ( R dw ). Hence, the union’s  i objective function can be reasonably addressed as the 
following idiosyncratic variant of the Oswald’s (1982) total rents formula  
 
= i U di R di i R i N dw w N w w ) ( ) ( 0 0 - + -  ; 2 , 1 = i                          (4) 
                 
On the other hand, given the above union membership configuration and assuming that 
employers are [unlike in Arrow (1972)] unbiased about the relative productivity of workers 
belonging to various groups, additional costs (i.e., beyond total labour costs: ) ( i i x C ) are implied 
in (2) whenever employment is not “balanced” among groups. Following De Fontenay and Gans 
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Given the European Council Antidiscrimination Directives (particularly #78), the sequence of 
events (see Fig.1) arising in the above context is then as follows.  
                                                        
12 In the cited authors’ context this specification implies that, to the eyes of firms, distinct input suppliers (workers 
with different reservation wages in our context) provide imperfect substitute inputs.   9 
At stage one a benevolent policy maker (PM), operating under balanced budget, handles a policy 
instrument (g ) with the aim to combat wage discrimination in the labor market of sector X. The 
policy maker is driven by the following lexicographic objective.  
○ Activates the policy instrument (e.g., 0 „ g ) so long as it is necessary and sufficient to induce 
non-discrimination in wages across employees, in each i firm, in the equilibrium.  
●○ Chooses the value of the policy instrument so as to maximize (minimize) the following gain 
(loss) function:  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 g C g DPS g DU g DCS DSW g G g - + + ” ” „                                       
(6) 
 
 Where, given the no-policy status quo, the operator D refers to the X-sector-specific derived 
differential in social welfare ( 0 „ g SW ) in case that  , 0 „ g  relative to the case where  . 0 = g  This 
differential, as typical, consists of similar differentials in Consumer Surplus (CS), Union Rents 
(U), and Producer Surplus (PS), and  ) (g C   is a measure of the  0 „ g  ensuing costs.  
At stage two decentralized wage bargains are conducted in each firm-union pair i, whilst firm-
specific employment decisions are left to each firm’s discretion. Given that the prospective 
employees/union members are  ex ante differentiated regarding their reservation wages, our 
interest is at this stage focused on whether firm-union bargaining  will  ex post deliver 
discriminatory (D) or non-discriminatory (ND) firm-specific wage rates. Respectively that is, 
whether  di i w w „ 0  or ndi di i w w w = = 0  in the (sub-game) equilibrium. We moreover assume that 
each union i, possesses all the power over the firm-specific wage bargain (monopoly union).  
At stage three,  if the firm-specific wage contract is non-discriminatory (e.g., 
ND; ndi di i w w w = = 0 ), each i firm chooses ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i s , optimally, so as in the continuation of the   10
game adequately advertise non-discrimination in firm-specific wages as an exertion of  firm-
specific csr;. Otherwise (e.g., D; di i w w „ 0 ), firm i by default sets  . 0 = i s   




                                                        
13 Note that, as it will be explicitly addressed later on, in case that under the no policy status quo  0 = i s  emerges 
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 3. Corporate Social Responsibility versus Wage Discrimination  
Assume for the moment that the no-policy status quo prevails at stage one. Solving the 
game by backwards induction, at stage four each  i  firm  independently adjusts its 
employment/output so that to maximize its own profits  (4). 
Since ) ( ) ( 0 0 di di i i i x N x N x ” + ” = ;  , 2 , 1 = i  the sub-game equilibrium is then defined by 
the vectors ), , ( 1 01 d x x ) , ( 2 02 d x x  which respectively maximize (7.1), (7.2) below. 
 
) )]( ( ) ( 1 {[ 1 01 2 02 1 01 1 1 d d d x x x x x x hs + + - + - + = P g           




1 01 1 1 01 01 s x x w x w x d d d - - - + - q                                                     (7.1) 
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2 02 2 2 02 02 s x x w x w x d d d - - - + -                                           (7.2)                      
 
           The  f.o.cs yield the following group-specific optimal employment/output rules for 
firm(s) . 2 , 1 = „ j i  
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             Summing up by pairs (8)-(9) and rearranging, we may subsequently get a regular system 
of reaction functions ) ( , j i i x RF x = , given the firms’  2 , 1 = „ j i  unit  cost(s) of 
production 2 / ) ( , 0 di i w w + , average over di i N N , 0 . 
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Solving (10.1)-(10.2) we in turn obtain the firm-specific total employment/output rules, 
(11.1), (11.2), which as expected imply strategic substitutability among the  , 2 , 1 = „ j i unit costs 
of production  Moreover,   2 , 1 = „ j i s  are similarly seen to be strategic substitutes from the point of 
view of firms  . 2 , 1 = „ j i . 
        
2
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Let us next consider stage three. As  postulated, if the firm-specific wage contract derived 
from stage two is non-discriminatory (i.e.,  ndi di i w w w = = 0  ), each  i firm optimally chooses 
] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i s  so as to adequately advertise it as an exertion of csr on the firm’s part in the 
continuation of the game. Let, for the moment, assume that ndi di i w w w = = 0 ;  , 2 , 1 = „ j i  emerges 
at stage two in the (sub-game) equilibrium.  In such an event, by 
substituting ndi di i w w w = + 2 / ) ( 0 ,  through  (11.1)-(11.2), into (7.1)-(7.2), and maximizing 
w.r.t 1 s , , 2 s  the optimal  i s  rules are found to be, 
 
2 2 2 1
4 ) 2 )( 2 (
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Let finally consider stage two. Given that firm  ] 2 [ 1 will unilaterally choose its 
output/employment level, 1 1 01 1 ) (( x x x N d ” + =   ], ) ( [ 2 2 02 2 x x x N d ” + = so that to satisfy (11.1) 
[(11.2)], and that firms would in any case allocate output/employment, across the - di i N N , 0  - 
groups of their employees, according to (8)-(9), union ] 2 [ 1  unilaterally and independently from 
union ] 1 [ 2  determines the firm-specific wage contract so as to maximize its total rents (4). Recall 
nonetheless that ndi di i w w w = = 0  ; , 2 , 1 = „ j i  is previously addressed to be the candidate 
equilibrium. Therefore, substituting ndi di i w w w = + 2 / ) ( 0 ,  through  (11.1)-(11.2), into (4), 
given (12), from the f.o.cs of the derived total rents formulae w.r.t  , , 2 1 nd nd w w we easily get the 
following non-discriminatory wage rate(s).  
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To check however whether (13)-(14) comprise part of a (sub-game perfect)  Nash 
equilibrium, let consider a unilateral deviation (d1) from the candidate equilibrium on the part of 
union1. That is, at stage two, and before the firm-specific wage scheme is announced , union 1 
considers setting  1 01 d w w „  instead of , 1 1 01 nd d w w w = = given that 
0 ); ( ; 1
1
2 2 2 = ” s s s w
d
nd  will be consistently (e.g., given 1 01 d w w „ ) chosen, respectively by 
union2, firm2 , and firm1, in the continuation of the game.
15 The following  ] , , , [ 2 2 1 01 s w w w nd d  
configuration is then seen to arise. 
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14 It can be readily checked that, if  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , , , ( ˛ d h wR g , then  . 1 0 < < b s   
15 We therefore postulate that stage two effectively consists of two sub-stages without delay.   15
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In consequence, for expository purpose considering , 1 ; 1 . 0 = = = q g R w  the union’s 
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the candidate non-discriminatory equilibrium [(13)], opting 
for a firm-specific discriminatory wage contract [(15) and (16)], depends on the sign of the 
following union rent differential (see Fig. 2a).
16 
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16 The  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , , , [( ˛ - d h wR g - £ > )] 1 ( ;q arising formulae of DU and DΠ [see (20) below] are available upon 
request.    16
On the other hand, to find out whether such a deviation is also compatible with the firm’s 
best interest, we need further to check the sign of the following profit differential (see Fig. 2a). 
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           Figure2a: Incentives to discriminate; 
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Figure 2b: Incentives to discriminate; 
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Figure2c: Incentives to discriminate; 
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As illustrated in Fig. 2a, each of differentials (19) - (20) defines a similar -downwards 
sloping- locus in the  ] 1 , 0 [ ] , [ ˛ d h  space. Thus, the latter space is partitioned into the following 
regions ) (R .  
 
, 0 ; 0 : 1 > P > d dU R , 0 ; 0 : 2 < P < d dU R   . 0 ; 0 : 3 < P > d dU R   
 
These partitions are then seen to establish the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 
For any given , 1 0 < < d  and ], 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w there exist  P h hU , 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; < ¢ < ¢ P d h d hU   : 
(i) 0 ) (< > DU  if  U h h ) (> < .   
(ii)  0 ) (< > P D   if  P > < h h ) ( .  
(iii)  . P > h hU   
For instance, if  0 @ d , and , 1 ; 1 . 0 = = = q g R w  then  0 ) (< > DU  if  085 . 0 ) ( @ > < U h h ; 
whilst,  0 ) (< > P D  if  . 075 . 0 ) ( @ > < P h h  
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Figure2d: Incentives to discriminate; 
Low 1 . 0 ; 1 ; 5 . 0 = = = R w q g  
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To check the robustness of lemma 1 we have performed all possible partitions in response 
to changes in the  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w  configuration; whilst lemma’s 1’s suggestions remained 
qualitatively invariant, quite intuitive insights have been moreover by that means arisen. As Fig. 
2b shows, both  P h hU ,    increase with R w , yet it remains ; P > h hU whilst,  P h hU ,  decrease 
withq  similarly (see Fig.2c).
17 On the other hand (see Fig.2d), while  U h  remains invariant,  P h  
decreases withg , hence, as g  decreases  P h  converges to U h  (thus  3 R  shrinks).  
To interpret those findings and conclude regarding the  Nash equilibrium let us 
analytically examine what happens at stage four, in the event of a unilateral deviation (on the 
part of union 1) from non-discrimination in wages at stage two. Considering the symmetric-firms 
case (e.g.,    1 = q ), the following differentials are for that quite illuminating.  
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Where, in the background of (22) the following reaction functions are operative (see Fig.3).  
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17 Note that, thus addressing the case 1 1 2 1 ” < < ” q q q , and since (as it will become evident later on) 
discrimination incentives decrease withq , we do not need to (also) consider   a similar unilateral deviation on the 
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Note now that, in Fig.3, the candidate non-discriminatory equilibrium is depicted where 












  2 , 1 ; = „ j i                                      (25) 
 
Then consider a unilateral deviation to wage discrimination on the part of union 1. In 
such an event, and since ￿ <1 R w 2 ) 1 ( < + d wR ,  so long as 0 > h  (22) takes a negative 
value. In Fig.3 that is depicted by  ) ( 2nd x RF [ ) ( 1nd x RF ] shifting to  ) ( 2
1
nd
d x RF [ ) (
1
1
d x RF ], 
implying a negative business stealing effect (bse) to firm’s 1’s production and profits arising 
from firm-specific wage discrimination. At the same time, however, (21) also takes a negative 
value, similarly implying a positive  unit cost effect (uce) to firm’s 1’s production and profits. In 
Fig.3, the latter effect is depicted by  ) ( 2
1
nd
d x RF shifting rightwards so as to counter (only a) 








d  where only the  bse is considered. Apart from those 
effects of wage discrimination, two direct costs also contribute in (20) and are thus embedded in 
the emerging isoprofit locuses. The first is suggested by (5) and it is essentially a fixed cost to 
the firm whenever the firm’s union discriminates wages; the firm would then 
adjust ) ( ) ( 1 1 01 01 d d x N x N = < = according to (8)-(9), given (15)-(16).  The second arises from (3) 
as a csr-advertisement cost incurred to the firm whenever its union delivers a non-discriminatory 
wage contract; hence, on the contrary, it would be zero under wage discrimination. What   21
nonetheless drives the non-discriminatory Nash equilibrium is that a non-profitable deviation to 
firm-specific discrimination in wages, like the one illustrated in Fig.3, would also be 
incompatible with the union’s best interest if h is (as lemma 1 suggests) sufficiently high.  The 
reasoning is as follows.  
First of all note that, if 0 = h , then firm-specific discrimination in wages ensues [as (21) 
and (22) suggest] no employment effect to the union’s total rents. At the same time the union, 
driven by its utilitarian objective, would through wage discrimination internalize the effect of the 
exogenous factor d  (which ex ante differentiates reservation wages) so that the remuneration of 
each one of its members to equally contribute to the union’s total rents in the equilibrium. To 
grasp the latter adjustment, note that if di i w w = 0  then the rent of an  di N -employee/union 
member would from the union’s point of view considered to be higher than the rent of an  i N 0 -
employee/union member, by as much as  ; ) 1 ( R w d -  hence, each union would opt for a 
discriminatory wage contract }, 2 / ) 1 {( : 0 R di i w d w w - + = in order to compensate that 
difference in group-specific rents in the equilibrium.  
If, however, , 0 > h  then the gain in both employment and wages brought by non-
discrimination [recall (22) and (21)] can be high enough so that the union would [as lemma 1 
suggests] trade off wage discrimination, as above driven, with higher total rents. While, 
regarding the firm, the ensuing  csr-advertisement cost and the adverse  uce would be both 
compensated by a favorable bse.  At this point recall (from Fig. 2a and Fig. 2d) that the firm’s 
criticalh  ) ( P h   diverges from the union’s one  ) ( U h  as the degree of brand differentiation 
decreases (e.g., as g  increases).  The reason is that, the higher isg , the stronger would be the 
adverse bse of firm-specific wage discrimination and, as a result, the higher would be the firm’s 
relative to the union’s incentive for non-discrimination in wages. 





In sum, the option of strategic csr on the firm’s part via non-discrimination in wages may 
in equilibrium prove to be compatible with both the firm’s and union’s best interest for the same 
reason: High enough gain in firm-specific employment/production which is  ceteris paribus 
driven by high enoughh.  
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Proposition 1  
a.  For any given  , 1 0 < < d and ], 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w  if  , 0 1 > ‡ > > P h h h U  then in the 
equilibrium both unions , 2 , 1 = „ j i  independently set non-discriminatory firm-specific 
contracts  ndi di i w w w = = 0 : ;  both firms  , 2 , 1 = „ j i independently adjust 
2 2 4 ) 2 )( 2 (









,so as to optimally advertise non-discrimination in firm-specific 
wages as an exertion of firm-specific csr.  
b.
18 Otherwise, i.e., if, for any given , 1 0 < < d and ], 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w    , 0 1 > > > > P h h hU  or 










+ = ; both firms  , 2 , 1 = „ j i  
independently set 0 = i s . 
 
 
4. Antidiscrimination Policy 
  Let now consider the policy maker’s role at stage one. Under the light of foregoing 
analysis and as regards the policy maker’s first order criterion (e.g., to combat wage 
discrimination), economic intuition suggests that non-discrimination in wages must be somehow 
subsidized whenever unions do not have sufficient incentives to opt for it; that is, as Proposition 
1b suggests, whenever  P > > h h hU  or h h hU > ‡ P . In any of the latter instances, the reason 
why the union does not find a non-discriminatory wage contract to its best interest is that the 
ensuing gain in total rents, in terms of both higher wage(s) and employment, is not high enough 
to compensate the union for the distortion brought in its utilitarian objective. This is in turn due 
to insufficient csr-advertisement on the firm’s part, the reason for the latter being that the csr-
advertisement costs are unprofitably high relative to the gain expected from a higher market 
                                                        
18 The proof for the second part (b) of Proposition 1 is analogous to the proof of the first part (a) in the previous 
pages.   24
share.  Therefore, a simple policy instrument for the policy maker to fight wage discrimination is 
to announce at stage one (and undertake at stage three) firm-specific  csr-advertisement 
whenever, and only if, the firm-specific wage contract (at stage two) is non-discriminatory. That 
is, , 0 > = s si  with ; 0 „ g . 0 =
A
i C Under these premises let assume that the candidate 
equilibrium is non-discrimination in firm-specific wages, i.e.  . 2 , 1 ; 0 = „ ” = j i w w w ndis di i  
Repeating our backwards induction algorithm, the group-specific employment/output rules  
derived at stage four are, 
 
)] 4 ( 2 /[ ] 2 ) 1 )( 2 [(
2
0 g g g - + - + - = = ndjs ndis dis is w w hs x x                                (26) 
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Consider now a unilateral deviation (d2) to wage discrimination, on the part of union 2, at 
stage two.
19 The following outcomes would then arise in the continuation of the game. 
 
     )] 4 ( 2 /[ }] 2 / ) {( 2 } 2 ) 2 [{(
2
2 02 1 1 01 g g g - + + - + - = = s d s s nd s d s w w w hs x x  
                                                                                                                                                  (28.1) 
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                            
(28.2a) 
                                                        
19Moreover, to avoid (also) checking for a unilateral deviation on the part of union i j „ , in assuring the Nash 
equilibrium, we here address the case 1 1 2 1 ” > > ” q q q .  
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Hence, the following critical differentials subsequently arise.  
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) 1 . 0 6 . 1 ( ] ) 3 . 25 ( 4 . 234 ) 1 . 0 [(
2
- - - -
= P                                               (37)           
 
It can be then readily checked that 
2 2 P > r rU s s for  ; 1 0 < < h   . 1 0 < < d It further 
proves that 
2 2 P > r rU s s  for all ) 1 , 0 ( ) , , , ( ˛ d h wR g .
20 Hence, so long as  rU rU s s s ” =
2  is 
announced at stage one, union 2 would effectively be deterred to deviate to a discriminatory 
                                                        
20 The  - ˛ - ) 1 , 0 ( ) , , , ( d h wR g
2 2 ; P r rU s s  formulae are available upon request.   27
wage scheme at stage two; therefore the non-discriminatory wage scheme can assured to be the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.  
As in turn regards the policy maker’s second order criterion (e.g., max ) (g G ) the 
following differentials are seen to arise under the suggested antidiscrimination policy.
21  
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         Henceforth, and considering that, under the suggested antidiscrimination policy, 
S g G s s U D PS D CS D g G ) ( ]} )
2
1
( 2 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ { ) (
2 2 ” = - + + = , it easily proves that the 
optimal  ) ( max s s ”  is given by (41) below. 
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Hence, it by simple comparison proves that > = = 1 ; 1 . 0 max g R w s rU s ,  for  ; 1 0 < < h  
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Yet, if 1 0 < < g , it turns out that rU s s < max  for sufficiently low [ d h, ] values, 
suggesting that, for such parameter configurations,  max s is non-binding and thus violates the 
sufficiency property of  policy maker’s first order criterion.  For tractability, 
let 5 . 0 ; 1 . 0 = = g R w , and consider the symmetric firms case (e.g. 1 2 1 ” = ” q q q ). Then, as 
illustrated in Fig. 4, the  ] 1 , 0 [ ] , [ ˛ d h  space is twice partitioned into the following regions ) (P . 
 
; 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( : 1 max > > rU s g G s g G P , max rU s s > ; 0 ) ( : 2 max > s g G P ; 0 ) ( < rU s g G
, max rU s s >      : 3 P ; 0 ) ( max < s g G ; 0 ) ( < rU s g G . ) ( max rU s s < >   
 
These partitions along with lemma 1 subsequently establish lemma 2.  
Lemma 2 
For any given , 1 0 < < d  and ], 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w   
a. There exist  ) ( P ‡ > h h h U U 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; < ¢ < ¢ < ¢ P d h d h d h U U   :  
(i)  ; 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( max > > rU s g G s g G , max rU s s >  if  . U h h >  
 (ii)  ; 0 ) ( max > s g G ; 0 ) ( < rU s g G , max rU s s >  if  . U U h h h > >  
(iii)  ; 0 ) ( max < s g G ; 0 ) ( < rU s g G , max rU s s >  if  . h hU >   
For instance, if  0 @ d , and , 1 ; 5 . 0 ; 1 . 0 = = = q g R w  then   . 085 . 0 ; 14 . 0 = @ U U h h  
 
b. There exist U h h h £ < < P 0   0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; < ¢ < ¢ < ¢ P d h d h d h U : 
; 0 ) ( max < s g G ; 0 ) ( < rU s g G rU s s < max , if  . h h <   
For instance, if   0 @ d , and , 1 ; 5 . 0 ; 1 . 0 = = = q g R w  then   . 065 . 0 = h  
 
  Our findings regarding antidiscrimination policy can be now summarized in the 
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Proposition 2  
For any given , 1 0 < < d  and ], 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( ˛ q g R w   
a. If  , U h h> or if  , U U h h h > > then the policy maker, driven by the necessity property of the 
first order criterion of its lexicographic objective, does not activate any policy instrument 
(e.g., ). 0 = g Yet, under the no-policy status quo, non-discriminatory wage contracts emerge in 
the equilibrium.  
 
b. If  , h h hU > > or if  , h h < then, to combat the emerging wage discrimination, the policy 
maker announces at stage one (and undertakes at stage three) firm-specific csr-advertisement, in 
the event of firm-specific non-discrimination in wages (at stage two). For that, the chosen level 
of firm-specific csr-advertisement is ) ( max rU s s >  in the first instance, while it is ) ( max s srU >  
in the second instance. In both instances, however, a net loss in social welfare arises in the - 
policy driven- non-discriminatory equilibrium. Respectively,  , 0 ) ( max < s g G . 0 ) ( < rU s g G  




  Under quite regular assumptions regarding union preferences, and in accordance with the 
stylized facts across Europe, we propose that powerful (monopoly) unions may opt for 
discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees. At the same time we nonetheless 
argue that firms may strategically opt for non-discrimination in firm-specific wages insofar as 
they would profitably advertise it as an exertion of corporate social responsibility (csr).  
Our findings suggest that, if the consumers’ valuation of non-discrimination is 
sufficiently high, then the firms’ csr/non-discrimination strategies would as well be compatible 
with the unions’ best interest in the equilibrium. If not, we propose that in order to combat wage 
discrimination a benevolent policy maker may find sufficient to announce and, instead of firms 
undertake, csr-advertisement in the event of non discrimination. It proves however that such a   31
policy always entails a net loss in social welfare, interestingly, yet intuitively, suggesting that, so 
long as the consumer-driven social valuation of non-discrimination is low enough, equality in 
pay across equally productive individuals is an inefficient arrangement.  
Our analysis, though stylized, remains robust along a number of dimensions. First, our 
propositions would be qualitatively sustained either we allow, or ignore, for technological 
asymmetries across firms. Second, similar results would emerge whether firms adjust their 
quantities or their prices in the product market. Third, depending on the relative weights assigned 
to the partial welfare of each group of workers, unions may still opt for wage discrimination even 
if we allow for a more “egalitarian” union objective function. On this issue nonetheless it seems 
more promising to consider firm-union bargaining about wages and/or employment, with the 
union’s bargaining power in any instance being less than one. 
On the other hand, three factual elements challenge the validity of our present 
suggestions. We have assumed that, first, equally skilled workers can be grouped according to 
different reservation wages. Second, unions effectively embody all kinds (groups) of equally 
skilled workers. Third, firm-union bargaining is decentralized at the firm level. Nonetheless, 
there is adequate evidence that those elements are often met in the European labour markets: 
Apart from the open shop scheme, firm-specific collective agreements are taking place in many 
European labour markets. While, given the European migrant experience over the last decades, it 
is rather unlikely reservation wages to be uniform, even across equally-skilled workers.    
Moreover, we have implicitly assumed that monitoring discrimination (versus  csr) is 
perfect and costless. Yet, it is easy to grasp that our proposed antidiscrimination policy is still 
valid if policy makers (effectively the society) are (also) willing to undertake the costs needed to 
ensure such monitoring. 
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